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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

In a commercial setting where economic conditions often change
rapidly and unexpectedly, to interpret all contracts that are indefinite as
to duration as binding in perpetuity would result in inequities to the
parties. On the other hand, to interpret all contracts that are indefinite
as to duration as terminable at will would lead to uncertainty and perhaps
defeat the clear intent of the contracting parties. It would be a rare case
in which the parties intended to make a contract that could be terminated
within one day or one week. A third approach would be to construe the
contract as enduring for a reasonable time. This approach would lend
a degree of certainty to the contract, yet would allow sufficient flexibility
to avoid unpredictable and inequitable consequences. In fact, the court
in Southern Bell may have implicitly adopted this approach and concluded that a reasonable time had elapsed, since the contract had endured
for nearly fifty years. The court was certainly justified in placing the
burden upon the contracting parties to make the terms of duration explicit
in the contract if they intended it to endure in perpetuity. When the
parties failed to manifest such an intent and when one party could not
show detrimental reliance, the court logically interpreted the contract as
terminable at will upon giving reasonable notice.
MICKEY A. HERRIN

Federal Courts-The "Erie Doctrine" and Tolling of the
State Statute of Limitation
Thus perhaps we can conclude that under the Constitution only Pennsylvania can say what tort duties are imposed on Pennsylvania landowners, that under the Constitution only the federal government can
say how the federal courts are to administer their proceedings, and
that under the Constitution it is a difficult and doubtful question whether
New York or the federal government should have the right to determine how promptly a suit must be brought in federal court to vindicate
a right created by the state.'
The "difficult and doubtful question" posed by Professor Wright came
into issue recently in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in the case of Atkins v. Schmutz Manufacturing Co.,' where an
1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 56, at 198 (1963).
401 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1968) (petition for rehearing en bane has been granted,
limited to the issue of whether either state or federal equitable remedies may be
available to plaintiff).
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injured worker became enmeshed in a "procedural booby trap" upon
attempting to sue the manufacturer of the machine that injured him.
This note will consider the methods available to extricate plaintiff from
such a trap, and will examine the rationale of the court of appeals in
denying him a trial on the merits.
Plaintiff was injured on June 22, 1961, in Virginia, when he became
entangled in a machine manufactured and sold by defendant; the accident
necessitated the amputation of both feet. Defendant's only place of
business was in Kentucky, and since Virginia then had no "long-arm"
statute,4 plaintiff reasonably elected to sue defendant in a Kentucky
federal court. Suit was brought on June 19, 1963-after the one-year
Kentucky statute of limitations5 had elapsed, but three days before the
two-year Virginia statute6 expired. At that time, however, Kentucky
law, as understood in the federal courts, permitted a foreign state's
statute of limitations to govern a cause of action arising in that state,
where the foreign statute of limitations allowed a longer period in which
to bring the action.7 Plaintiff's procedural problems began when the
Kentucky Court of Appeals announced, while his case was pending in
a Kentucky federal court, that in such cases the Kentucky statute would
prevail,8 and that this rule applied retroactively.' Defendant's motion for
summary judgment was granted, the judgment was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,'" and certiorari denied by the
United States Supreme Court." An action in a Virginia federal court
followed, and that court also granted summary judgment for defendant,
finding that the action pending in the Kentucky court had not tolled the
two-year Virginia statute of limitations.' 2 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed,'- with Judge Craven dissenting. The decision
to deny relief to the plaintiff merits close scrutiny.
'Id. at 735 (Craven, J., dissenting).
'Such a statute has since been enacted. VA.
1968).
'Ky. REv. STAT. § 413.140 (1942).
'VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24 (1957).

CoDE

ANN. § 8-81.2 (Cum. Supp.

"See, e.g., Collins v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 299 F.2d 362 (6th Cir.

1962) ; Koeppe v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 250 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1957) ; Burton
v. Miller, 185 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1950).
8 Seat v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 389 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1965).
v. Griggs, 392 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1965).
"Wethington
"0Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 372 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1967).
"Atkins
v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 389 U.S. 829 (1967).
"2Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 268 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Va. 1967).
"Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 401 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1968).
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What in existing law required such a severe result? The court of
appeals relied on a Virginia statute, 14 which enumerates the instances in
which a statute of limitations is suspended, and cited a Virginia case, 5
which in another situation had strictly construed that statute. The court
found that had the action been brought in a state court, the statute of
limitations would not have been tolled, and applying what the court
perceived to be the principle of ErieRailroadv. Tompkins,'( a majority of
the three-judge court held that they were bound to this construction, citing
as additional authority Guaranty Trust Co. v. York." Judge Craven
did not agree. In a scholarly and well-reasoned dissent, he presented a
forceful argument that the "Erie Doctrine" did not forbid granting plaintiff a trial on the merits, and expressed doubt as to the continuing vitality
of Guaranty itself. The dissent raises issues long assumed to have been
settled, but worthy of reconsideration.
It is helpful to begin with a summary history, familiar to every firstyear law student, of the "Erie Doctrine." Traditionally, the Rules of
Decision Act' has required federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction
to apply the laws of the states; Swift v. Tyson,'" however, held that the
language of the Act referred only to statutory law, and that the decisions
of state courts were not binding on the federal judiciary, even though the
substantive rights were state-created. This pattern prevailed until 1938,
when the Supreme Court in Erie overturned nearly a century of precedent
and held that state decisional law was henceforth to be weighted equally
with state statutory law by federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction. This was followed in 1941 by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing Co.,20 which significantly extended the Erie principle
to require a federal court to adopt the conflict of laws rule of the state
in which it sits. Then came a startling development in 1945, when the
Court held in Guaranty that a federal court, being "only another court
of the state,"'" was to apply state law whenever necessary to insure that
the "outcome" of the litigation would be the same as if the action had been
brought in a state court ;22 thus a state statute that required the same
" VA. CODE AN. §§ 8-30 to -34 (1957).
" Jones v. Morris Plan Bank, 170 Va. 88, 195 S.E. 525 (1938).
18304 U.S. 64 (1938).
" 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
1828 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
1941 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
'313 U.S. 487 (1941).
21326 U.S. at 108.
."Id. at 109.
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statute of limitations at law and in equity was accepted as controlling.
The "intent" of Erie was declared to require this "outcome-determinative"
test, and the case was cited for that proposition.2 Subsequent cases
hastened, on authority of what became known as the "Erie Doctrine," to
apply state law to a variety of problems, many of which had traditionally
been denominated "procedural" in other contexts, until it seemed likely
that even the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would succumb to "out24
come-determinative" analysis.
The theory was weakened, however, in 1958, when the Supreme Court
decided in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.2 ' that
even where the outcome could arguably be determined by choice of the
federal rule, that rule would prevail if there were a strong federal policy
in favor of its application compared to a relatively weak state interest
in the state law. There the strong federal policy favoring jury trials
expressed in the seventh amendment was found to outweigh a state rule
requiring judges to determine factual issues in workmen's compensation
proceedings. In 1965, another partial refutation of the earlier post-Erie
cases was announced in Hanna v. Plumer;2' Federal Rule 4(d) (1),27
describing the federal manner of service of process, was held to prevail
over a Massachusetts rule that demanded in-hand service. Though the
same result could have been reached in conformity to the post-Erie cases,
the decision is significant for the breadth of its language, which impliedly
shielded the entire Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against potential
Erie attacks. Moreover, Hanna arguably overruled Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer Co.,2 8 which had held that Federal Rule 3,20 providing that the
filing of a complaint commences an action in federal court, yielded to a
local rule that deemed an action commenced by service of process. The
distinction was crucial, for between filing of the complaint and service of
process the statute of limitations had run.
It should be noted that though the Erie decision purported to rest
on constitutional grounds, no specific portion of the Constitution was
23 Id.

"See, e.g., Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal
Rules, 3 VAND. L. Rav. 711 (1950); Note, The Erie Case and the Federal RulesA Prediction, 39 GEo. L.J. 600 (1951); Clark, Book Review, 36 CORNELL L.Q.
181 (1950).

U.S. 525 (1958).
"380 U.S. 460 (1965).
.F R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1).
"337 U.S. 530 (1949).
Fm. R. Civ. P. 3.
25356
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mentioned in Justice Brandeis' majority opinion, and the existence vel non
of a constitutional basis for Erie has been a topic widely debated by
legal scholars.3 0 Regardless of the obscurity of Erie's precise constitutional basis, however, it can reasonably claim some inherent foundation
in the spirit of that document, if not its letter, for it echoes a fundamental
tenet of federalism. The rigid determinism of Guaranty, on the other
hand, is clearly without any such constitutional compulsion, innate or
explicit.
Further, it is at least arguable that the Rules of Decision Act does not
require extension to the extreme reached in Guaranty and its progeny.
That statute provides that the "laws of the several states" are to be "rules
of decision" in the federal courts, with two exceptions: (1) except where
the federal Constitution or federal statutes "otherwise require or provide,"
and (2) only "in cases where they apply.""1 Under the first exception,
a possible argument is that article III and the diversity statute determine
what causes will be heard by the federal courts, and presumably require
federal procedure to administer them. But such statutes merely grant
the court jurisdiction, not require it,32 as is recognized in the abstention
doctrine.33 As to the second exception, arguably the only "cases" where
the state rules apply are cases involving substantive issues, and a state
procedural rule, being directed by its very terms to the state courts, is
simply not applicable in a federal court. This, obviously, is only the old
"substance-procedure" dichotomy in another form."4
The oft-cited "Erie Doctrine" is thus only remotely based on the
Erie holding. Technically, that decision merely clarified and enlarged
slightly the words of the Rules of Decision Act. Actually, it was the
subsequent line of decisions-Klaxon, Guaranty,Ragan, Angel v. Bullington, 5 and others-that formed the basis of the "Erie Doctrine" as it is
" Compare Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946), with Hart, The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 489 (1954), and Smith,
Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TUL. L. REv. 443 (1962).
3128 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
" Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). But cf. Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-30 (1816).
"See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n
v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943); Railroad Conun'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
" Cf. Meador, State Law and the FederalJudicial Power, 49 VA. L. Rnv. 1082

(1963).

"330 U.S. 183 (1947).
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commonly known today, modified by Byrd and Hanna. These post-Erie
cases seemed to require that federal courts "mirror," as closely as
possible, the state courts, and that state rules, no matter how "procedural"
for other purposes, were to govern the federal courts if the outcome of
the litigation hinged on their application. Justice Rutledge, dissenting
in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,86 was persuaded that the
courts had misapplied the Erie principle:
But the Erie case made no ruling that in so deciding diversity cases
a federal court is "merely another court of the state in which it sits,"
and hence that in every situation in which the doors of state courts
are closed to a suitor, so must be also those of the federal courts. Not
only is this not true when the state bar is raised by a purely procedural
obstacle. There is sound historical reason for believing that one of the
purposes of the diversity clause was to afford a federal court remedy
when, for at least some reasons of state policy, none would be available
in the state courts 3 7
If, as suggested by the absence of other bases, the Guaranty doctrine rests only in judicial policy, then of course it may be altered by
judges. A reconsideration by the courts of the function and purpose of
diversity jurisdiction in a federal system is desirable. It was said in
Byrd that "[t]he federal system is an independent system for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction,""8 and
that "state laws cannot alter the essential character or function of a
federal court." 9 If only the Guaranty line of decisions were controlling,
that "essential character or function" would be limited to providing a
forum distinguishable from its neighboring state courts only in the most
minimal detail. But is this the reason for which diversity jurisdiction
finds a place in the Constitution? Is it not the function of the federal
courts to insure diverse litigants a "juster justice,"4 0 perhaps even to
set an example by the enlightened use of judicial power? Or, as put by
Professors Hart and Wechsler: "Once we conclude that the summurn
bonum of diversity litigation is a federal court which perfectly mirrors the
courts of the state in which it is sitting, is it possible to attribute any
rational purpose to the diversity clause?'"41 It is necessary to remember
" 337 U.S. 541, 557 (1949).
ST Id. at 558.
38 356 U.S. at 537.
"
Id. at 539, quoting Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931).
"'The
phrase is borrowed from H. M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm
4"1Id.

at 635.

652 (1953).
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that Erie alone does not confine the federal judges to the "role of the
ventriloquist's dummy" ;42 that interpretation stems from post-Erie cases
that have misapplied it, and that are themselves grounded neither in the
Constitution nor in congressional command. It is unlikely that federalism
is better served by requiring federal courts to assist state courts in denying a remedy for a prima facie substantive right-itself state-createdparticularly, as in Atkins, when it is far from clear that the state court
itself would have denied its citizen a remedy against a foreign defendant.
Aversion to "forum-shopping" alone cannot be the answer, for undisputedly "procedural" considerations frequently influence choice of
forum, as where an attorney prefers the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to an antiquated state code, or believes he will find better-trained judges,
or is motivated by a difference in jury selection procedures. Further, if
"forum-shopping" is the ogre it is represented to be, why is it more of
one as between adjacent state and federal courts, yet excusable among
geographical areas within the federal court system ?
If the above analyses of policy and precedent be reasonably accurate,
then, as Judge Craven put it, there is "room for doubt"4 whether the
majority in Atkins was correct in disposing of plaintiff's problem by
summarily citing Erie and Guaranty and proceeding to infer what the
Virginia court would do when confronted by a situation it had never
encountered. This is far removed from any result compelled by Erie
alone, and it ignores the modification of the Guaranty doctrine in Byrd
and Hanna, which, it would seem, deserved at least parenthetical mention. Judge Craven, reluctantly conceding for purposes of argument the
validity of Guaranty, pointed out that plaintiff's remedy-trial on the
merits--could still have been granted him without resorting to an Erie
analysis. The facts peculiar to plaintiff's situation suggest several alternative bases for relief.
By clever use of the federal transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1964),
,"Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942) (quoted by

Judge Craven in Atkins, 401 F.2d at 735).
'"
C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 58, at 205, gives another example of the doubleedged nature of the forum-shopping argument:
Unless some freedom is vouchsafed the federal judge, the Erie doctrine will
simply have substituted one kind of forum-shopping for another. The lawyer
whose case is dependent on an old or shaky state court decision which
might no longer be followed within the state, will have strong incentive to
maneuver the case into federal court, where, on the mechanical jurisprudence
which the Erie doctrine was once thought to require, the state decision cannot be impeached.
"401 F.2d at 735.
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Judge Craven illustrated how the entire problem could have been avoided
when it became apparent that relief could not be obtained in the Kentucky
federal courts. When the one-year statute of limitations was held to
prevail over the Virginia statute, plaintiff was then in a "wrong" judicial
district within the meaning of § 1406, and could have transferred to
the Virginia district court without the statute of limitations of either
state barring his claim. 5 Thus, trial on the merits could have been had
even though the state statute of limitations had run, through the purely
mechanical method of operation of the federal courts, which is undoubtedly
not a matter of state regulation. The significance of this route's availability is to demonstrate how "procedural" the problem really is; for what
considerations of policy require the statute to be a bar in the Atkins
situation, but allow its tolling through invocation of the right technical
devices ?
The problem could also have been resolved within the confines of the
post-Erie doctrine. Byrd held that where a strong federal policy competes
with a weak state policy, the federal rule prevails. It is especially ironic
that by paying lip service through Erie to state law and policy, the
majority in Atkins becomes subject to the same criticism that brought
about the demise of Swift v. Tyson-discrimination in favor of nonresidents against residents. "The essence of diversity jurisdiction," said
Justice Frankfurter in Angel, "is that a federal court enforces State law
and State policy."4 6 It is beyond belief that one could seriously impute
to Virginia a policy that would allow a foreign corporation to mangle
one of its citizens within the borders of that state and leave him without
a remedy. The recently-enacted "long-arm" statute,47 in fact, suggests
just the opposite. And if there is a strong federal and a strong state
interest in the same result-trial on the merits-then the Byrd "balancing"
test would seem to demand that result. As to the policy behind application of the statute of limitations, that, too, is hardly controlling, for where
there is an identical action involving the same parties pending in another
court, there is little danger of stale claims based on obscure evidence and
fact. This argument is particularly appealing in the instant case, where
extensive discovery was under way prior to dismissal of the Kentucky
action.4 8
" Cf. Goldllawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
U.S. at 191.
"VA. CODF, ANN. § 8-81.2 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
Brief for Appellant at 7, Appendix for Appellant at 21-25, Atkins v. Schmutz
Mfg. Co., 401 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1968).
'6330
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The defendant in Atkins, by confining its jurisdictional "presence"
to a state that allowed assertion of remedies within only a very short
time was permitted, in effect, to defeat both the right and the remedy
created by the plaintiff's state. A persuasive case could be made, as
Justice Rutledge pointed out in Guaranty, that the diversity clause was
inserted to afford protection against exactly this form of abuse of state
sovereignty. 49
If the result in Atkins was required neither by Erie, nor by the Constitution, nor by congressional mandate, nor even by post-Erie case law,
and if the relevant policy considerations militate against it, then why did
the court of appeals feel constrained to deny plaintiff relief, particularly
when, as the court itself admitted, the "equities" of the case "strongly
favor[ed]" him?" The answer can be found in the confusion prevalent
among the lower federal courts as to the proper scope of the Erie principle. Perhaps the injustice done Donald Atkins in the name of this
doctrine will serve as a catalyst for resolution of the conflict. Certainly,
Byrd and Hanna are evidence of growing dissatisfaction with the mechanistic application of "outcome-determination," and it is arguable that they
foreshadow a trend towards dignifying the role of the federal court in
diversity litigation, perhaps even by directly overruling Guaranty and
the brood it has spawned. An appealing solution is that suggested by
Justice Harlan, concurring in Hanna:
To my mind the proper line of approach in determining whether to
apply a state or a federal rule, whether "substantive" or "procedural,"
is to stay close to basic principles 'by inquiring if the choice of rule
would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human
conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation. 5'
C. FRANK GOLDSMITH, JR.

Wills-Ghosts in North Carolina-The Haunting rrobleni of the

After-Discovered Will
Given a death in North Carolina, a will or intestate administration
will normally follow fairly quickly, enabling all concerned to get their
4°326 U.S. at 118-19.
80401 F.2d at 733-34.
380 U.S. at 475. See H. M. HART & H. WEcHSLER, supranote 40. Cf. Angel
v. Bullington, 150 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1945) (opinion of Dobie, J.), rei'd,330 U.S.
183 (1947).

